Kolok's application for adjustment was denied on September 30, 2009 (Doc. 26, Exh 2). On October 1, 2009, the Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear, placing Kolok in removal proceedings (*Id.*, Exh 1). Kolok was charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i) and 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(1); ICE cited Kolok's criminal convictions in 2004 and 2006 for Contempt of Court and Assault with a Deadly Weapon. Kolok was ordered removed to Sudan on May 13, 2010 (Doc. 45, Exh 4). He has waived his right to appeal and is currently being detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 pending removal. (Doc. 41 at 5, n. 1). Upon learning of the conclusion of his removal proceedings, it appeared to the Court that the authority under which Kolok is being detained by the government had changed. On September 15, 2010, the Court ordered Kolok to show cause why this habeas petition should not be dismissed as moot (Doc. 43).

In his response, Kolok argues that his habeas case is not moot because it falls within the "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception to mootness. He argues that ICE has a long-standing policy of detaining refugees under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a). Kolok further contends that the average length of detention under § 1159(a) is less than the amount of time required to adjudicate a habeas petition in federal court. As a result, Kolok argues that he and other refugees will be deprived of any opportunity to seek judicial review of their detention if the Court finds that a petition has become moot whenever the legal authority for the individual's detention has shifted or the person has been released. He specifically asserts that a finding of mootness in this case "will permit ICE to indefinitely continue its policy of arbitrarily detaining refugees for months with no civil or criminal charges and no access to bond" (Doc. 44 at 4).

In the alternative, Kolok argues that even if the Court finds that ICE has discontinued the policy of detaining refugees under § 1159(a), the "voluntary cessation" exception to mootness applies. In such cases, Kolok argues, it is the burden of the party alleging mootness to show that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. In this context, Kolok maintains that the Court has the responsibility to determine

whether an action that may render a claim moot was, in fact, initiated by the party alleging mootness as a means to avoid litigation.

Kolok argues that the Arizona Guidance Memorandum issued by ICE on November 10, 2009 does not satisfy this burden. In that memorandum, ICE issued written guidance explaining that any decisions surrounding the detention of unadjusted refugees must be made in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1226, and 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d). Those provisions require that, in the absence of an emergency or other extraordinary circumstances, a determination must be made within 48 hours whether to release an alien or place him or her in removal proceedings (Doc. 45, Exh 1). On May 10, 2010, the ICE Director of Detention and Removal Operations issued a guidance memorandum to all ICE Field Offices throughout the United States dictating that an unadjusted refugee's failure to adjust status is not a proper grounds for detention. The memorandum also dictated that unadjusted refugees must be detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, and a determination must be made within 48 hours whether to release the alien or place him or her in removal proceedings (Doc. 45, Exh 2).

Kolok's due process rights because they violate current Bureau of Immigration Appeals and circuit case law. Specifically, Kolok argues that the effect is to place refugees in removal proceedings prior to a decision by an immigration official on inadmissibility. Kolok further argues that even if they did not violate current case law, ICE has failed to comply with the memoranda. He cites a recent case where ICE had still not issued a Notice to Appear over three weeks after the unadjusted refugee had been detained, and only did so the day following his filing of a habeas petition. *See* Doc. 32, Exh 1.

The government contends that Kolok's claims are moot because he was ordered removed and is lawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231. Specifically, the government argues that Kolok no longer has a personal stake in the outcome and thus there exists no case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. In his petition, Kolok argues that he is being unconstitutionally detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1159. The

government contends that since his final order of removal, he is lawfully being detained pursuant to § 1231. Indeed, as the government points out, he was initially mandatorily detained under § 1226, as an inadmissible alien who committed a crime of moral turpitude.

The government rejects Kolok's argument about the possibility of future detention as an exception to mootness. Specifically the government argues that Kolok's speculation about the possibility of future detention, without factual support, does not defeat mootness, because the government has shown that detention of both Kolok individually and other unadjusted refugees under § 1159 is not capable of repetition.

Kolok cannot reasonably dispute that once the government commenced removal proceedings and charged him with removability, his detention was mandatory under § 1226 based upon his assault conviction. *See Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder*, 558 F.3d 903, 922 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2009). In addition, Kolok cannot dispute that he is currently being lawfully detained under § 1231 because of the final order of removal. That change in the authority under which he is currently being detained makes his petition challenging that detention moot, absent some exception.

The Court is not persuaded by his arguments that either of the cited exceptions would apply to his current status. He has not demonstrated any real or immediate threat that he will be subjected to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1159. *See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons*, 461 U.S. 95, 101-102, 108-109 (1983). In addition, although not necessary to the Court's determination, the Court notes that the ICE memoranda dictating the authority for detention of unadjusted refugees and the narrow time frame for making the decision whether to release the alien or place him or her in removal proceedings makes Kolok's argument even more speculative. The memoranda also support the government's position that continued detention under § 1159 "could not reasonably be expected to recur." *Rosemere Neighborhood Ass'n v. United States EPA*, 581 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2009). Finally, Kolok seeks relief as an individual, not on behalf of any other party. Therefore, his argument that other unadjusted refugees either have been or will be subject to continued detention under § 1159 cannot form

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a basis for any exception to mootness. Qassim v. Bush, 466 F.3d 1073, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1 2 2006). 3 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Kolok Kolok's petition for writ of 4 habeas corpus be **denied as moot** (Doc. 1). 5 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 6 7 Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The 8 parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 9 within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have seven 10 11 days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the 12 Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report 13 and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. 14 Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any 15 factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right 16 to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 17 Magistrate Judge's recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. DATED this 13th day of December, 201 18 19 20 David K. Duncan United States Magistrate Judge 21 22 23 24

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